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congressional purpose of protecting the farmer's home and property.10
To promote uniformity and to clarify the section, Congress amended it20
Senator Borah, a member of the committee, explained the amendment
indicating clearly an intention to allow petitions to be filed "during
the period of redemption" or "during the period of moritorium pro-
vided within the state."21 The period of redemption expires in some
states when foreclosure proceedings are instituted, in others when
sale is made, in others when the sale is confirmed, and yet in others
when the deed is delivered.22 Undoubtedly the ambiguous phrasing of
the section is a result of the draftsman's endeavor to extend to the
farmer the right to file his petition during the period of redemption
in his particular state.23 This excess of caution placed the section
in jeopardy, but the Court rightly decided that a fair reading of the
entire section, supplemented by a knowledge of the legislative history,
indicates a clear intent to extend the bankruptcy jurisdiction only
over property which still remains subject to redemption under state
law at the time of filing the petition. 24
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
AGRICULTURE AS INTERSTATE COMMERCE
Plaintiff seeks declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of
the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938,1 as amended May 26, 19412
with regard to the commerce clause3 and asks that the Secretary of
Agriculture of the United States be enjoined from enforcing the mar-
keting penalty imposed by that act upon wheat grown in excess of
the 1941 marketing quota.4 From a judgment granting the injunction,5
19. Sen. Rep. No. 985, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935); H. R. Rep. No.
1808, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
20. See note 16 supra.
21. 79 Cong. Rec., Pt. 15 at 15632.
22. Jones, Mortgages (8th ed. 1928) §§1695-1746; Wiltsie, Mortgage
Foreclosure (5th ed. 1939) §1199.
23. See instant case at 131 (dicta). But see Mr. Justice Murphy dis-
senting in instant case at 133 where he states " . . . If Congress
so intended its words were poorly chosen. Congress could easily
have declared that bankruptcy jurisdiction does not survive the
extinguishment of the equity of redemption under state law,. .. '
24. See instant case at 130.
1. 52 Stat. 31 (1938), as amended 7 U.S.C. §1281 et seq., 7 U.S.C.A.
§1281 et seq. (Supp. 1942).
2. 55 Stat. 203 (1941), 7 U.S.C. §1340 (Supp. No. 1), 7 U.S.C.A.
§1340 (Supp. 1942).
3. U.S. Const. Art. I, §8, cl. 3.
4. The quota provisions in the act include all wheat grown whether
for sale or for farm consumption. 54 Stat. 727 (1940), 7 U.S.C.§1301(b) (6) (A,B), 7 U.S.C.A. §1301(b) (6) (A,B) (Supp.
1942). The term "market" includes the disposal of wheat "by
feeding (in any form) to poultry or livestock which, or the pro-
ducts of which are sold, bartered, or exchanged, or to be so dis-
posed of." Ibid. The Court in the instant case 63 Sup. Ct. at 86
interprets this to mean that "penalties do not depend upon whether
any part of the wheat either within or without the quota is sold
or intended to be sold."
5. Filburn v. Helke, 43 F. Supp. 1017 (S.D. Ohio 1942).
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defendant appeals. Held, reversed. Wheat grown for farm consump-
tion has an economic effect upon interstate commerce and is subject to
legislative regulation under the commerce clause. Wickard v. Filburn,
- U.S. -, 63 Sup. Ct. 82 (1942).
The definition of "commerce" traditionally set forth by the courts
included all manner of transportation and commercial intercourse, but
did not include such productive enterprise as agriculture.6 However,
federal authority over interstate commerce is plenary and complete
and by extension of the "necessary and proper" powers of Congress, 8
federal authority has been held to cover all intrastate activities which
are "in the stream of," 9 which "burden and obstruct"1o or are "co-min-
gled with""l interstate commerce. But, as a limitation upon this
power over intrastate commerce, the Court held that only those intra-
state activities which "directly affect" interstate commerce could be
regulated.12 This indicates a test based upon relationship of the cause
6. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 303 (1936); Foster-
Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 10 (1928); Adair
v. U.S., 208 U.S. 161, 177 (1908); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v.
U.S., 175 U.S. 211, 241 (1899); Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Penn-
sylvania, 114 U.S. 196, 203 (1885); County of Mobile v. Kimball,
102 U.S. 691, 702 (1880); Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 193(U.S. 1824); Willis, Constitutional Law (1936) 278-295.
7. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 196 (U.S. 1824).
8. U.S. Const. Art. I, §8, cl. 18, construed in McCulloch v. Maryland,
4 Wheat. 316, 421 (U.S. 1819).
9. Swift & Co. v. U.S., 196 U.S. 375 (1905); Board of Trade of
Chicago v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1 (1922); Stafford et al. v. Wallace,
258 U.S. 495 (1922); Lemke v. Farmers Grain Co. of Embden,
258 U.S. 50 (1922); Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant,
257 U.S. 282 (1921).
10. National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1 (1937); Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Stone Cutters Ass'n.,
274 U.S. 37 (1927); Real Silk Hosiery Mills v. City of Portland,
268 U.S. 325 (1925); Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co. of Embden
et al., 268 U.S. 189 (1925); Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352(1913); Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. U.S. 175 U.S. 211 (1899);
Alvies, The Commerce Power-from Gibbons v. Ogden to the
Wagner Act Cases (1937) 3 Ohio St.L.J. 307.
11. Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1938); Railway Commission of
Wisconsin v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry., 257 U.S. 563(1922) ; Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352 (1913); Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U.S. 194 (1912).
12. Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Stone Cutters Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37 (1927) ;
Real Silk Hosiery Mills v. City of Portland, 268 U.S. 325 (1925);
Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co. of Embden et al., 268 U.S. 189(1925); United Leather Workers Union v. Herkert, 265 U.S. 457(1924); Board of Trade of Chicago v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1 (1922);
Stafford et al. v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922); Lemke v. Farmers
Grain Co. of Embden, 258 U.S. 50 (1922); State of N.Y. et al. v.
U.S. et al., 257 U.S. 591 (1922); U.S. v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525
(1913); U.S. v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); Swift
& Co. v. U.S., 196 U.S. 375 (1905); Northern Securities Co. v.
U.S., 193 U.S. 197 (1904); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. U.S.,
175 U.S. 211 (1899).
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rather than degree or magnitude of the effect.13 Many important
opinions have been written in terms of this "direct effect" test.14
Even under this interpretation of the commerce clause, such intra-
state activities as mining,15 manufacturing 8 and agriculture' 7 were
almost unanimously declared to be outside federal authority by reason
of the Court's limitation requiring "direct effect" upon interstate com-
merce.'8
Several opinions have indicated that this "direct effect" test is
arbitrary and impractical.9 The instant case suggests that it has
been used both to arrive at a result and to state results arrived at by
other means.20 Furthermore it has been criticised because it considers
the relation of the cause rather than degree of effect, thus leaving
13. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 308 (1936); Minne-
sota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 410 (1913); U.S. v. Ferger et al.,
250 U.S. 199, 203 (1919); Temple, Federal Power over Things
Which Affect Interstate Commerce (1937) 4 Ohio St.L.J. 56.
14. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Coronado Coal
Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295 (1925); also notes 12
and 13 supra.
15. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Oliver Iron
Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172 (1933); Heisler v. Thomas
Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245 (1922).
16. Utah Power and Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165 (1932); Ham-
mer v. Dagenhart et al., 247 U.S. 251 (1918); U.S. v. E. C.
Knight, 156 U.S. 1 (1895); Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888);
License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462 (U.S. 1866).
17. U.S. v. Butler et al., 297 U.S. 1 (1936); Baldwin v. Seelig, 294
U.S. 511 (1935); Chassaniol v. City of Greenwood, 291 U.S.
584 (1934); Federal Compress and Warehouse Co. v. McClean,
291 U.S. 17 (1934); McCready v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 94
U.S. 391 (1876). See Industrial Ass'n of San Francisco et al.
v. U.S., 268 U.S. 64, 82 (1925); Willis, Constitutional Law (1936)
294.
18. The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 31, was de-
clared unconstitutional as an unauthorized use of the taxing
power to indirectly invade state authority over local agricultural
production. U.S. v. Butler et al., 297 U.S. 1 (1936). The Act
of 1938 was tested as to its tobacco provisions, 52 Stat. 31, 7
U.S.C. §1311 et seq., 7 U.S.C.A. §1311 et seq., in Mulford et al.
v. Smith et al., 307 U.S. 38 (1939), in which the Court held that,
since the tobacco provisions were couched in terms of marketing
rather than acreage allotments, the Act could be upheld as a
regulation of transactions in interstate commerce and not of pro-
ductive enterprise. It is submitted that the same reasoning, if
applied to wheat provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act
existing at that time, 52 Stat. 31 (1938), 7 U.S.C. §1331 et seq.,
7 U.S.C.A. §1331 et seq., and to the tobacco provisions as subse-
quently amended, 52 Stat. 31 (1938) as amended, 7 U.S.C. §1311
et seq. (Supp. 1), 7 U.S.C.A. §1311 et seq. (Supp. 1942), would
render them unconstitutional as they are written in terms of
''acreage allotments."
19. Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. National Labor Relations Board,
303 U.S. 453, 466 (1938). See Mr. Justice Stone dissenting in
Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 44 (1927). In Swift &
Co. v. U.S., 196 U.S. 375, 398 (1905), the Court said "commerce
among the states is not a technical legal conception, but a prac-
tical one, drawn from the course of business."
20. Instant case, 63 Sup. Ct. at 88.
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federal authority fettered in situations where widespread impact upon
interstate commerce may be merely the "indirect effect" of an intra-
state activity.21
In 1936,22 however, this test was definitely abandoned by a deci-
sion2 3 holding that labor relations of a manufacturing enterprise could
be regulated by federal authority. Here the term "substantial effect"
was substituted for "direct effect"; the question was treated as one
of degree of effect rather than relation of the source; and the court
relied on the "necessary and proper" powers of Congress to uphold
this regulation as "an appropriate means" of prctecting interstate
commerce.2 4 This break from the old "direct effect" test is now well
established in the decisions rendered since 1936,25 with the possible
exception of Mulford et al. v. Smith et al.26 in which the court was
able to reach a similar result although apparently adhering to the
old concept.27 In these cases local productive enterprise is brought
within federal authority under the commerce clause28
The instant case is a further development of this new interpreta-
tion of the commerce power. It marks a more or less formal adoption
of an economic measure29 of federal authority over interstate com-
merce, which has only been hinted at in previous cases.30 The court
takes judicial notice of the economics of the wheat industry, and
concludes that farm consumption of wheat is such a variable factor
21. U.S. v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 115 (1942); Santa
Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 303
U.S. 453, 466, 467 (1938); National Labor Relations Board v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 36-41 (1937).
22. National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1 (1937).
23. National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.
v. U.S., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
24. National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.
v. U.S., 301 U.S. at 36-41. See also the dissenting opinion in that
case at 76 et seq. which indicates the sharp departure from prece-
dent.
25. Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942); U.S. v.
Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110 (1942); U.S. v. Darby Lum-
ber Co., 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v.
Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940); U.S. v. Rock Royal Cooperative
Inc. et al., 307 U.S. 533 (1939); National Labor Relations Board
v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601 (1939); Consolidated Edison Co. et al.
v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U.S. 197 (1938); Santa
Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. U.S., 303 U.S. 453 (1938); Fruehauf
Trailer Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 49 (1937).
26. 307 U.S. 38 (1939).
27. See note 22 supra.
28. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940)(mining); U.S. v. Rock Royal Cooperative Inc. et al., 307 U.S.
533 (1939) (dairy industry); National Labor Relations Board v.
Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601 (1939) (clothing manufacture).
29. Instant case Sup. Ct. at 88.
30. U.S. v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942); U.S.
v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100, 123 (1941); National Labor
Relation Board v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 606 (1939); Shreve-
port Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342, 351 (1914).
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that it must be controlled to make federal regulation effective. 3 1 The
language of the court indicates that all legal tests have been aban-
doned in favor of a purely economic test for determination of the
extent of federal authority in this field.3 2 However, in practical ef-
fect, the decision seems merely to further define the term "substantial
effect" now used by the Court as a legal test.
Apparently Congress may now regulate any intrastate activity
which "substantially affects" interstate commerce, and that "substan-
tial effect" may be merely the economic impact of some intrastate
activity, regardless of its source or its relation to interstate commerce.3 3
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
MILITARY TRIAL OF SABOTEURS
Seven men, allegedly sent to the United States by the German
Reich to sabotage war industries, landed within an American defense
zone, proceeded ashore and buried their uniforms and equipment.
Several days later they were captured and held in custody by the
Provost Marshal of the Military District of Washington for trial
before a Military Commission created by the President, on charges
of violation of the law of war, certain Articles of War, and con-
spiracy. Applications for leave to file petitions for habeas corpus
were presented in their behalf to the Federal District Court and
upon denial, appeals were perfected to the United States Supreme
Court. Held, that the charge alleged an offense which the President
was authorized to order tried by a military commission, that the com-
mission was lawfully constituted, and that the accused were not entitled
to trial by jury in the civil courts. United States ex rel, Quirin v. Cox,
317 U.S. -, 63 Sup. Ct. 1 (1942).
The important question to be determined is the status of the
petitioners, that is, whether they are lawful combatants or unlawful
combatants.
The right of the President as President and Commander-in-chief
of the Army and Navy, under the Constitution and Articles of War,
31. "Consumption (of wheat) on the farm where grown appears to
vary in an amount greater than 20 per cent of average produc-
tion." . . . "It can hardly be denied that a factor of such volume
and variability . . . would have a substantial influence on
price and market conditions." Instant case 63 Sup. Ct. at 90, 91.
32. Instant case, 63 Sup. Ct. at 88.
33. It is apparent that this shift from the "direct effect" test to a
test of "substantial effect" which may be merely economic leaves
the Supreme Court with greater discretionary powers than here-
tofore exercised by that judiciary. Interestingly enough some of
the members of the Supreme Court have evidenced a fear that
such a broad interpretation of the commerce clause would result
in a breakdown of our federal system of government. See Apex
Hosiery Co. v. Leader et al., 310 U.S. 469, 513 (1940); Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 295 (1936); U.S. v. Butler, 297
U.S. 1, 75 (1936); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495,
546 (1935) ; Hammer v. Dagenhart et al., 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918);
U.S. v. E. C. Knight, 156 U.S. 1, 15 (1895). See National Labor
Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 95,
96 (1937) (dissenting opinion).
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